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Abstract  
Objective: Emergency response and resilience are critical to air transport due to their role in 
ensuring the safety of people and assets. In most accidents, the performance of the cockpit 
team plays a significant role in restoring the operations or minimizing the loss. The team 
resilience in the transport sector as a whole is understudied. We seeks to identify the 
influential factors in cockpit team resilience and analyze their effect on team performance in 
air transport emergency and crisis. 
Design/methodology/approach: A team resilience analysis framework is utilized, adopted 
from other resilience studies. The OODA LOOP model is applied to evaluate the team 
performance in emergency situations in three recent air transport accidents. 
Findings: The analysis found that team communication and coordination were among the 
key issues to emergency response. This is traced back to cockpit resource management 
training and its effectiveness in improving onboard team performance and leadership. The 
effect of team-related factors such as unity and culture, on team resilience is also highlighted. 
 
Keywords: OODA LOOP, organizational management; transport management; cockpit 
resource management 
 
1. Introduction  
The air transportation sector is a multifaceted sociotechnical system involving interaction of 
human operators and technical systems. The capability of air transportation to sustain 
operations by adjusting those in the face of a wide range of disturbances (e.g. delays, disaster, 
weather, aircraft malfunctions, etc.) is a vital feature. In spite of technological signs of 
progress in aviation and navigation like the introduction of the glass cockpits, or the 
developments of global aviation training (GAT), air transport accidents remain an issue. The 
 
  
last four years have seen continuous increase in the number of accidents (from 2.15 to 2.73 
accidents per million departures according to the International Civil Aviation 
Organization).Aviation accidents relate to loss of life and assets, thus instigating social and 
economic losses, as well as reputational damage (to companies and the sector). Therefore 
the study of team resilience and its potential to lower accidents is significant.  
In the past 5-10 years there were more studies on the resilience of workforce in the 
workplace. Team resilience has been explored in more detail around sports science (see 
Morgan et al. (2015); Gorgulu et al. (2018), engineering see Chialastri and Pozzi (2008), 
health care Sommer et al. (2016); McCray et al. (2016), military training Mjelde et al. 
(2016), organizational behaviour Johansson et al. (2018); King et al. (2016), etc. Those 
studies are mainly in the non-aviation sector, while the transport (and specifically the 
aviation) sector are understudies.  
Although procedures and regulations tend to specify the working process in aviation to 
a considerable extent, the flexibility and system oversight of pilots and crew onboard are 
essential for efficient and safe operations in normal and non-normal conditions. The 
capability of the onboard crew to subsist accidents is crucial especially when the obstacle 
and the undesirable impact are high, difficult to control, and need instant reaction with no 
time to plan an adequate response. Hence, teamwork is necessary for the onboard crew 
because not only teams bring synergy, but aircraft operations require management and good 
communication between crew members to complete team tasks. Teamwork also helps crews 
adjust to rapidly changing processes and highly automated systems and juggle conflicting 
goals to ensure and safe, efficient and environmentally friendly operations. 
The need for the global aviation sector to develop resilience guidelines in emergency 
situations is gaining momentum. However, trivial consideration is given to developing the 
resilience of the onboard team. Few studies deal with team resilience and emergency 
response (e.g. Morgan et al. 2013). Current research tends to prioritize factors like 
leadership, organization, interaction, and safety culture that are vital to the performance of a 
team. For instances, team resilience and team performance depend on interaction and 
organisation. Interaction and organisations are mainly influenced by monitoring of activities, 
attention redirection to perceived priorities, an implicit delegation of responsibilities, as well 
as explicit verbal assignation of activities (see Lundberg and Johansson, 2015). This 
enhances team members onboard to have safe aeroplane operation. 
Our paper reviews the role of team performance and resilience in emergency response 
in the aviation domain. Our aim is to assess the significant factors in team resilience and how 
team performance can be measured in aviation. We utilize earlier findings from team 
resilience study in the maritime domain (see Nguyen et al. 2019). We analyze several 
aviation accident reports and compare those against the team resilience factors to identify 
the gaps in accident study and develop quality performance assessments for onboard crew. 
We demonstrate the importance of cockpit resource management training for better onboard 
team performance. We also highlight the importance of unity and culture in team efficiency 
on board. In what follows, section 2 offers a review on team resilience. In section 3 we 
demonstrate the analytical framework that is later on applied to analyse three case studies 




2. State-of-the-art in team resilience – an overview 
2.1 Viewpoint to team resilience 
By definition, a team is a group comprised of members with high task interdependency, 
shared goals and shared values Dyer (1984). They are usually organised hierarchically and 
sometimes dispersed geographically. An important characteristic of a team is that team 
members do not work in isolation. Instead, they work together, share information and 
coordinate to accomplish the team’s objective. Unlike work carried out independently by 
individuals, teamwork requires interactions and interdependence between team members. 
Moreover, this helps to create social capital that offers the emotional bond and closeness 
between team members during difficult times Morgan et al. (2013).  
One key attribute of teamwork is that it typically involves interaction with varying style 
and levels. The level of interaction can be important to team performance Stachowski et al. 
(2009). Yet, the interaction between team members and their performance also depends on 
other factors such as their relationship. There are two views on this. According to the first 
view, effective teams will engage highly consistently in an emergency or crisis. It can be 
argued that it would be impossible to train people for specific situations because crises are 
unique Yu et al. (2008). Therefore, it is important for the team to develop readiness and be 
prepared for unexpected situations. Similarly, teams that consistently maintain the 
established interaction norms and follow the same role structure may avoid the ambiguity of 
having to determine prioritisation and distribution of tasks Waller (2001).Those trained to 
be familiar to their prescribed roles and procedures are expected to behave more predictably 
and orderly Stachowski et al. (2009). According to the second view, routinized interaction 
patterns may inhibit flexibility and response in unexpected situations Hedlund et al. (1998). 
Pattern complexity could also affect team effectiveness Burgoon (1993) because teams that 
fail to adapt and adjust their interaction patterns may be less effective Gersick and Hackman 
(1990).   
Team resilience refers to the capacity of a team to overcome crises and difficulties 
Morgan et al. (2017). It is the ability to “either thrive under high liability situations, 
improvise, and adapt to significant change or stress, or simply recover from the negative 
experience”. However, team resilience differs from individual resilience in many ways 
Alliger et al. (2015). Overall, it is expected that the performance of a good team is better 
than the sum of its individuals. Team work’s focus is on collectivism, not individualism. 
Team performance depends heavily on sharing, communication, coordination and 
leadership, while individual performance depends on different factors such as health and 
education Page (2008). 
It has also been recognised that communication is a critical factor in team performance 
Stout et al. (2003) because it enables members to learn and support each other. Team 
learning and collective orientation are also important as they help team members to gain 
knowledge and collective intelligence and improve team performance Kim et al. (2017). 
Through the communicating and sharing of information and experience, team members can 
develop enhanced learning resourcefulness and behavioural preparedness in adverse 
circumstances Lengnick-Hall et al. (2011). Teams with a learning orientation are more likely 
to overcome challenges and be performing better in the long run. The team that has enhanced 
 
  
their competencies is more likely to register and deal with the complexity of dynamic 
decision milieus Sutcliffe and Vogus (2003). 
The work Sauer et al. (2006) identified barriers against effective team communication, 
e.g. high workload, cultural difference and time that team members have come to know each 
other. Information sharing and shared cognition are important factors in team performance 
Entin and Serfaty (1999). To the opposite, an important factor of team resilience is diversity 
within the team. Teams that include at least some members with experientially wider skill 
may be better able to grasp variations in their circumstances. They are also better able to see 
specific changes that need to be made and may also be better at handling those changes 
Knapp (2010). At the same time, diversity increases the team’s access to resolving problems 
under challenging conditions. Diversity in a team can facilitate greater situational awareness, 
which contributes towards better decision-making and increased options for actions. This 
enhances the ability to handle complexity and increases their motivation and persistence in 
handling challenges using more effective strategies Chapman et al. (2020). 
Leadership has also been found to be influential to team performance due to its 
extensive effect on the team including decision making, mental support, intellectual 
stimulation and influence. Inspirational influence helps the team leader to empower team 
members and promote the team’s internal strength to enable it to achieve its goals Jung et 
al. (1995). Intellectual stimulation promotes intelligence and problem-solving ability. 
Across different fields such as sports and competition, leadership helps stimulate the team 
and provides a proactive approach in challenging and difficult situations Rodríguez-Sánchez 
and Vera Perea (2015). Moreover, strong leadership can leverage team cohesion and enhance 
the team’s resilience to withstand stressors.  
One aspect of leadership is transformational leadership. Transformational leaders 
empower teams to be more self-assured in their capability to deal with failure and inspire 
them to take risks. This will pursue innovative and ingenious events which promotes the 
levels of team resilience behaviour, which in turn may enhance the levels of team viability 
Dimas et al. (2018). Moreover, transformational leadership influences team resilience 
through the leader's frequent reinforcement of the team's strategic priorities. Kozlowski and 
Ilgen (2006) suggested that this process operates through perceptual filtering whereby people 
take in new information and interpret it, according to prior experiences, to reduce uncertainty 
about new experiences. 
Another key factor influential to team performance is team coordination that ensures 
team members work toward the team’s objective and support each other Lundberg and 
Johansson (2015). In emergencies, the role of teams becomes more evident in reaching a 
successful outcome. Thus, the ability to operate as a coherent team increases the resilience 
of a given group Rodríguez-Sánchez and Vera Perea (2015). 
 
2.2 Resilience in Air Transportation  
Air transportation has perhaps the shortest history and the fastest revolution amongst all 
transport modes we use nowadays. Air transport offers the quickest means of moving people 
and cargo across geographical locations at varying distances. Its workplace is the whole 
world, so it deeply needs international rules to be enforced properly on an international scale. 
 
  
Hence, international organizations and national authorities set up rules and guidelines 
regarding air transport nationally and internationally. However, aviation staff are essential 
to adjust to fast-changing methods and highly automated arrangements and misrepresent 
conflicting goals to ensure ever safe, competent and globally friendly processes (Hesse et al. 
2013)  
The aviation industry believes the introduction of resilience might be a helpful concept 
in improving safety management in order to have continuously safe and efficient operations 
(Hesse et al. 2013). Eurocontrol (2009) has provided the following meaning of resilience in 
air transportation: “resilience is the intrinsic ability of a system to adjust its functioning prior 
to, during, or following changes and disturbances, so that it can sustain required operations 
under both expected and unexpected conditions“.  
Resilience in aviation pertain to four basic elements: anticipate, monitor, react and learn 
(Woltjer et al. 2015). Being able to anticipate developments further into the future refers to 
anticipating possible disturbances, new opportunity, and varying operation circumstances, 
etc. Monitoring means the capability of knowing what to search for, which could seriously 
affect the system’s performance. Reacting is the ability to self-prepare for any situations that 
are occurring now or might occur in the future. Learning is the ability to obtain new 
knowledge from experience. These four basic elements enhance resilience in air 
transportation to withstand stressors (Owen et al. 2017). 
Another factor in resilience air transport to ensure effective safety management is 
resilience safety culture. Resilience safety culture is defined as an organizational culture that 
persuades safe practices, reassures the method of dynamic and effective safety reporting 
Kozlowski and Ilgen (2006). Resilience safety culture is influenced by four properties in air 
transportation: learning culture, reporting culture, just culture and flexible culture. Learning 
from all relevant sources such as accident, flight data, risk analyses, etc. helps to improve 
safety organization in the air transportation field. Reporting culture is informing an incident 
that is occurring or might occur during a flight operation, which helps to reduce possible 
errors. The just culture assumes that nobody in the organization is punished or mistreated in 
any shape or form for omissions as long as their decisions are commensurate with their 
experiences and training and the context of the action is taken into Akselsson et al. (2009). 
The flexible culture is where skills, knowledge and abilities determine who takes the lead or 
performs a task in difficult situations such as emergencies and shifting back again when the 
problems are resolved Akselsson et al. (2009). Hence, continuous improvement is an 
important concept in resilience safety culture that needs to be implemented in future 
research. 
While all those factors are being investigated in literature, the significance of team 
resilience in air transport remains an understudies area. The safety standards and procedures 
strongly focus on individual skillsets and capabilities of the flight crew, while putting a lesser 
focus on the team dimension of resilience, related to proper coordination, trust, leadership 
and interaction.  
 
3. Description of the analytical framework for assessment of team resilience 
There are four vital aspects acknowledged in literature when developing analytical 
frameworks to analyse team resilience: Coordination Amaral et al. (2015); 
 
  
Sharing/cohesion/trust, Amaral et al. (2015); Leadership Morgan et al. (2013); 
Communication/interaction Gucciardi et al. (2018). 
It is vital to take into account the emergency response method, where team resilience 
occurs and originates from, in order to identify the characteristics of resilience particularly 
in emergency response (Gucciardi et al., 2018).There are several existing systemic resilience 
models developed as a factor of team resilience, none of which considered team resilience. 
Such is the case for the systematic resilience model proposed in Lundberg and Johansson 
(2015), which considers several elements, e.g. functional dependencies, constraints, the 
capability to regulate or acclimate, tactics (see Figure 1). The method is allocated into 5 
categories, identified as ‘Anticipate’, ‘Monitor’, ‘Control’, ‘Recover’, and ‘Learn’ Nguyen 
et al. (2019).  
As a substitute to the systematic resilience model, the ‘OODA LOOP’ was developed 
(Boyd, 1996). The OODA LOOP structure for the emergency response procedure includes 
the phases of ‘Observe’, ‘Orient’, ‘Decide’, and ‘Act’ Linthicum (2012). The OODA LOOP 
allows that ‘implied guidance and control’ procedure and ‘nourish forward’ process to exist 
simultaneously. The model of the procedure is proposed in Figure 2. The OODA LOOP 
includes no team factors which is why it is not applicable for teamwork, despite its 
popularity. That is why the work Nguyen et al. (2019).  proposed an analytic framework for 
team resilience in emergency response that reflects the key team resilience characteristics 
and emergency response process. The model has possibilities for alteration and modification 
to adapt to various needs. For instance, the four-element in OODA LOOP - ‘Observe’, 
‘Orient’, ‘Decide’, and ‘Act’ can be substituted with ‘Respond’, ‘Engage’, ‘Act’, 
‘Communicate’ and ‘Transition’ from the REACT framework Linthicum (2012). 
 
 





Figure 2: OODA LOOP (Boyd 1996). 
 
4. Case study of team resilience in air transport  
This section presents three case studies from aviation accidents and explores the role of team 
resilience. Each case study uses detailed accident reports. We employ the analytical 
framework from section 3 to integrate emergency response and teamwork.  
The first dimension – emergency response – has four elements corresponding to the 
following four response stages of the OODA LOOP model developed in Boyd (1996) and 
Von Lubitz et al. (2008): 
• ‘Observe’; 
• ‘Orient’; 
• ‘Decide’; and 
• ‘Act’. 
The OODA LOOP model was chosen because of relevance to emergency response in air 
transport. It also allows for the co-presence of an ‘implied guidance and control’ technique 
and the ‘nourish forward’ method.  
The second dimension – teamwork – includes four elements as per the literature review:  
• Coordination Gomes et al. (2014); Amaral et al. (2015) 
• Sharing/cohesion/trust Amaral et al. (2015); Stephens et al. (2013); Lionel 
(2015). 
• Leadership Morgan et al. (2015); Dimas et al. (2018); Sommer et al. (2016); and 
• Communication/interaction Gomes et al. (2014); Gucciardi et al. (2018); Lionel 
(2015). 
As accident reports are essentially text documents, this analysis is essentially qualitative 
but can be extended to incorporate statistical analysis, thus allowing for mixed qualitative-
quantitative analysis. The qualitative analysis is based on the coding with the themes derived 
from integrating the response and teamwork dimensions from the above integrated 
framework, for example, ‘Sharing-Observe’, ‘Sharing-Orient’, ‘Sharing-Decide’, ‘Sharing-
Act’, ‘Communication-Observe’, ‘Communication-Orien’, etc. The results of contents 
 
  
analysis are then presented in a tabular form as a table in which each cell contains contents 
relevant to one theme of the above factors. Each cell also reports the number of counts for 
the corresponding theme, which are used for quantitative analysis. The quantitative analysis 
tests if there is any relationship between the two dimensions, i.e. whether teamwork has any 
role in emergency response process that was experienced by the team. Given the nature of 
data being nominal or categorical, non-parametric Chi-square tests are applicable with 
specifications given in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Hypothesis test of the relationship between team factors and response stages 
Hypotheses: 
• H0: There is no relationship between teamwork and emergency response process 
• H1: There is a relationship between teamwork and emergency response process 
Test statistic: 
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Data were collected from the Cockpit Voice Recorder Database. The three cases 
concerned accidents involving Ethiopian Airlines ET-302, Southwest 1380, and Air France 
447. Each has a cockpit voice recorder transcript. The Appendix Tables A1 to A3 report the 
analysis results of team resilience for the three respective accidents. Given the three case 
studies, there are 4 tests, including three tests for the three cases and a fourth one using the 
data pooled from all the three cases together. 
Tables A1 to A3 show the actions and communication between the team members 
through the four stages of accident response process, Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act. The 
first stage – Observe – with 48 total counts has most extensive information compared with 
the others, followed by Act with 40 counts, Orient with 35 counts, and Decide with 27 counts.  
On the other hand, Sharing and Communication appear to have most counts, 46 and 43 
respectively. This is expected due to the fact that the reports provide communication related 
information. Leadership and Coordination have the least number of counts of 29 and 32 
items respectively. Again, this indicates that factors with a small number of counts were least 
observable.  
It is important to note that factors with a small number of counts were least observable. 
Thus, the analysis must be done with care and findings are only for references. Yet, there 
was a high level of complexity involved in the four stages of response process and not all 
the details were revealed or captured by the report. 
Table 2 reports the analysis result of pooled data. Across all the three cases, there was 
insufficient evidence to reject any relationship between team factors – Sharing, 
Communication, Leadership, and Coordination – and the four stages of the response process 
 
  
– Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act. The values of the 2χ  statistics for the three cases are: 
6.18, 4.93, and 2.22 respectively. In all cases, the pvalue is larger even than the 10% significant 
level, showing no significance. The result of the pooled data analysis has 2χ  of 7.31 and 
pvalue of 0.605 (also showing no significance). This confirms no relationship between the 
team factors and the response stages. 
 
 
Table 2: Pooled analysis result 
Team factor 
Response stages 
Observe   Orient   Decide   Act    Total 
Sharing 13 14.7 9 10.7 9 8.28 15 12.3 46 
Communication 18 13.8 13 10.0 5 7.74 7 11.5 43 
Leadership 9 9.28 6 6.77 6 5.22 8 7.73 29 
Coordination 8 10.2 7 7.47 7 5.76 10 8.53 32 
Total 48 48 35 35 27 27 40 40 150 
Test result 




The paper expanded knowledge in the team resilience in aviation, as an understudies 
domain. We reviewed the role of team performance and resilience in emergency response in 
the aviation domain, where there is a limited amount of studies. We emphasized the 
importance of organizational aspects to such emergency circumstances in planes. We 
adopted the OODA LOOP analytic framework from other domains of resilience (e.g. 
maritime) to classify the aspects significant to team resilience in air transportation accidents 
applying former developments in this field. We gave an overview on the framework and 
utilized it to discuss and evaluate the team resilience and performance in three aircraft 
accidents, related to Ethiopian Airlines 302, Southwest 1380, and Air France 447. The 
analysis of the cases showed that interaction and organization are some of the crucial factors 
in onboard teams’ emergency response and it is what grounds sternness in the aftereffects 
from aviation accidents in many occurrences. We were able to trail that back to training 
ethics and excellence and its effectiveness in educating onboard team performance.  
Our findings are an initial step in understanding the role of team resilience in air 
accidents and how its improvement can reduce air accidents (or their severity). We 
demonstrated the importance of cockpit resource management training for better onboard 
team performance, as well as unity and culture. Those findings can serve to improve training 
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APPENDIX: Case study analysis 
 
Table A1. Ethiopian Airlines 302 
Team  Response process    
 Observe Orient Decide Act 
Sharing: sharing 




other safety, etc.  
 The Captain advised the First-Officer to 
contact radar. 
 Captain requested flaps up  
 Captain asked the First-Officer to 
request to maintain runway heading. 
 The Captain asked the First Officer to 
pitch up together and said that pitch is 
not enough. 
 
 The Captain advised again 
the First-Officer to request 
to maintain runway 
heading and that they are 
having flight control 
problems. 
 
 The First-Officer reported 
to ATC that they were 
unable to maintain SHALA 
lA and requested runway 
heading 
 First Officer reported SHALA 2A 
departure crossing 8400 ft and 
climbing FL 320. 
 First Officer  acknowledged 








 The First Officer called out Master 
Caution Anti-Ice on CVR. 
 Captain called out "Command" 
 Radar controller identified ET-302. 
 The stabilizer trim cutout switches were 
in the "cutout" position 
 The Captain instructed the First Officer  
to advise ATC 
 Both pilots called out "left alpha vane". 
  
 Instructed to climb FL 340 
and when able right turns 
direct to RUDOL 
 Captain called out three 
times "Pull-up" 
 That they would like to 
maintain 14,000 ft and 




 First-Officer requested ATC 
to maintain 14,000 ft and 
reported that they are 
having flight control 
problem 
 The First-Officer acknowledged. 







 Three Ground Proximity Warning System 
(GPWS) "DON'T SINK" alerts occurred. 
 The Captain asked the First-Officer if the 
trim is functional. 
 
 The First-Officer has 
replied that the trim was 
not working and asked if 
he could try it manually. 
 The Captain told him to try. 
 
 The Captain advised the First-Officer 
to trim up with him. 
 The First-Officer replied that it is not 
working. 
 
2 1 1 2 
8 3 1 3 









 Manual electric trim in the ANU 
direction was recorded and the stabilizer 
reversed moving in the ANU direction 
and then the trim reached 2.3 units 
 The Captain asked and the First-Officer 
requested radar control a vector to 
return 
 The First-Officer called out 
"stab trim cut-out" two 
times. 
 ATC instructed ET-302 to 
turn right heading 260 




 Captain agreed  
 The selected heading was 
changed to 262 degrees. 
 
 
 First Officer confirmed stab trim cut-
out. 




Test result Chi-square statistic: 6.14 
P-value:  0.726 
 
Table A2. Southwest 1380 
Team  Response process    
 Observe Orient Decide Act 
Sharing: sharing 




other safety, etc.  
 there was a "gray puff of smoke" 
and a sudden change in cabin 
pressure 
 Three flight attendants were 
assigned to the flight 
 As they moved toward the mid-
cabin, 
 
 All four reported that they heard 
a loud sound and felt a vibration. 
 they found the passenger in row 
14 partially out of the window 
 began moving through the 
cabin to assist passengers 
with their masks. 
 attempted to pull her 
inside. 
 They donned their oxygen masks, 
 The flight attendants retrieved 
portable oxygen bottles 
 They were able to retrieve her with 











 The flight crew stated that the 
departure and climb from 
LaGuardia were normal with no 
indications of any problems 
 They reported that the 
aircraft yawed with several cockpit 
alarms 
 she first requested the nearest 
airport 
 
 but quickly decided on 
Philadelphia. 
 The controller provided vectors to 
the airport with no delay. 
3 2 2 3 
2 2 2 2 
 
  
 The flight crew reported that the 
aircraft exhibited handling 
difficulties throughout the 
remainder of the flight. 









 The captain took over flying duties 
 The captain initially was planning 
on a long final approach to make 
sure they completed all the 
checklists 
 
 The captain requested a 
diversion from the air traffic 
controller 
 but when they learned of the 
passenger injuries 
 she decided to shorten the 
approach 
 








 the first officer was flying, and the 
captain was monitoring. 
 there was a "gray puff of smoke" 
and a sudden change in cabin 
pressure. 
 aircraft rolled left to about 40 
degrees 
 
 before the flight crew was 
able to counter the roll with 
control inputs. 
 
 They donned their oxygen masks, 
 the first officer began a descent. 
 removed from the aircraft alive 
 
Test result Chi-square statistic: 4.93 
P-value:  0.840 
 
  
4 1 1 1 
2 2 1 1 
1 2 1 3 
 
  
Table A3. Air France 447 
 Team  Response process   
 Observe Orient Decide Act 
Sharing: sharing 




other safety, etc.  
 Let’s go for the anti-icing system. 
It’s better than nothing. 
 Let’s go for the anti-icing system. 
It’s better than nothing. 
 Robert has no idea that, despite 
their conversation about 
descending. 
 The men are utterly failing to 
engage in an important process 
known as crew resource 
management, or CRM. 
 We’ve totally lost control of the 
plane. 
 As the plane is buffeted by 
turbulence. 
 
 We seem to be at the end of the 
cloud layer, it might be okay. 
 Pay attention to your speed. 
 It is not clear to either one of 
them who is responsible for 
what, and who is doing what. 
 We don’t understand at all 
 What do you think? 
 The captain urges Bonin to level 
the wings 
 You can possibly pull it a 
little to the left. 
 okay, I’m descending. 
 What should we do? 
 Robert tries to take back 
the controls, and pushes 
forward on the stick, but 
the plane is in "dual input" 
mode. 
 At last, Bonin tells the 
others 
 We’re agreed that we’re in manual 
 Here we go, we’re descending. 
 Bonin has continued to pull back on 
the side stick. 
 They are failing, essentially, to 
cooperate. 
 Left seat taking control! 
 We’ve tried everything 
 Inputs with those of Bonin, who 
continues to pull back. 
 The crucial fact whose import he has 
so grievously failed to understand 
himself. 
 Bonin yields the controls, and Robert 







 The pilot warned the cabin crew 
that they were about to enter an 
area of turbulence. 
 I’ll call you back as soon as we’re 
out of it. 
 There’s no good speed indication. 
 The stall warning continues to 
blare. 
 No one mentions the word "stall." 
 Damn it, we’re going to crash. 
 
 
 Yes, let’s call them in the back, 
to let them know. 
 What the hell are you doing? 
 With no hint of understanding 
the nature of their problem. 
 The men briefly discuss, 
incredibly 
 You’ll want to take care. 
 I think that’s not a bad idea. 
 Before agreeing that they 
are indeed descending. 
 Give your friends a heads-up 
 the three pilots discuss the situation 





 After having attended the briefing 
between the two co-pilots. 
 This is a natural result of having 
two co-pilots flying the plane. 
 He, too, seems unaware of the 
fact that the plane is now 
stalled. 
 He almost certainly would have 
understood, as a pilot with many 
hours flying light airplanes, the 
 The captain had sent one of 
the co-pilots for the first 
rest period. 
 He woke the second pilot. 
 Intention of taking the second break 
himself. 
 The captain left the cockpit to rest. 
 Pulls back on the stick as well. 
6 4 3 3 





 When you have a captain and a 
first officer in the cockpit, it's clear 
who's in charge. 
 The captain returns to the cockpit. 
 
insanity of pulling back on the 
controls while stalled. 
 No, no, no… Don’t climb… no, 
no. 
 One who seems to have a 
somewhat better grasp of 
the situation. 
 The captain of the flight 
makes no attempt to 
physically take control of 
the airplane. 
 









 Turbulence penetration speed. 
 The aircraft's stall warning 
sounded briefly twice due to the 
angle of attack tolerance being 
exceeded. 
 Icing event had lasted for just over 
a minute 
 The turbulence, the strange 
electrical phenomena. 
 Plane has barely enough forward 
speed for the controls to be 
effective. 
 
 The aircraft started to roll to the 
right due to turbulence. 
 His colleague's failure to route 
around the potentially 
dangerous storm. 
 Bonin reacts irrationally. 
 
 The pilots turned the 
aircraft slightly to the left. 
 He pulls back on the side 
stick to put the airplane 
into a steep climb. 
 He is holding the stick all 
the way back. 
 Bonin once again takes 
back the controls. 
 Decreased its speed 
 The pilot reacted by deflecting his 
side-stick to the left. 
 The pilot continued making nose-up 
inputs. 
 Almost as soon as Bonin pulls up into 
a climb, the plane's computer reacts. 
 Pulls his side stick all the way back. 
Test result Chi-square statistic: 2.26 
P-value:  0.987 
 
 
5 3 4 5 
4 3 4 5 
